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RESTORING CONGRESS’S ROLE IN THE
MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Christopher J. Walker*
Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and Separation of Powers. By Josh Chafetz. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press. 2017. Pp. x, 315. $45.
Introduction
We live in a modern regulatory world, vastly different from what the
framers could have imagined. As I have noted, “the focus and function of
lawmaking have shifted from judge-made common law, to congressionally
enacted statutes, and now to agency-promulgated regulations.”1 For instance, by the end of 2016, the Code of Federal Regulations exceeded
175,000 pages and included tens of thousands of rules.2 That’s more than
one hundred million words and one million regulatory restrictions; it would
take over three years for one employed full time to read the entire Code.3 In
2016, federal agencies reached a new regulatory record by filling over 95,000
pages of the Federal Register with adopted rules, proposed rules, and notices—nearly 20% more than the 80,000 or so pages published in 2015.4
Roughly two-fifths of those pages in 2016 were devoted to 3,853 final rules,
an increase from the 3,410 final rules federal agencies promulgated in 2015.5
* Associate Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State
University. Thanks to Jonathan Adler, Michael Bopp, Kristin Hickman, Amanda Neely, Dakota
Rudesill, Peter Strauss, and Philip Wallach for insightful comments on prior drafts and to
Kenzie Nothnagel for excellent research assistance.
1. Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 999,
1000 (2015).
2. See Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Competitive Enter. Inst., Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State 19, 20 fig.14 (2017),
https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Ten%20Thousand%20Commandments%202017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6TDC-3JPR] (reporting the total pages at the end of 2016 as 185,053).
3. See Mercatus Center, QuantGov Regulatory Clock, QuantGov, https://quantgov.org/
charts/the-quantgov-regulatory-clock/ [https://perma.cc/X37W-CRK3] (reporting statistics as
of February 7, 2018, with time based on reading 250 words per minute in a full-time job).
4. Crews, supra note 2, at 59 (reporting the total pages at the end of 2016 as 97,069,
compared to 81,402 pages at the end of 2015). Of the 97,069 pages in 2016, 1,175 were blank.
Id.
5. See id. at 17, 75. See generally Maeve P. Carey, Cong. Research Serv., R43056,
Counting Regulations: An Overview of Rulemaking, Types of Federal Regulations,
and Pages in the Federal Register 18 tbl.6 (2016) (providing year-by-year statistics on the
content of the Federal Register by pages and actual numbers of proposed and final rules).
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By contrast, the 114th Congress, over that same two-year period, enacted just 329 public laws for a total of 3,036 pages in the Statutes at Large.6
In January 2014, Senator Mike Lee took to Facebook to visually depict the
shift in lawmaking from legislation to regulation:

Behold my display of the 2013 Federal Register. It contains over 80,000
pages of new rules, regulations, and notices all written and passed by
unelected bureaucrats. The small stack of papers on top of the display are
the laws passed by elected members of Congress and signed into law by the
president.7

Counting words, pages, and laws is by no means a flawless method for capturing the extent of this trend in federal lawmaking. But there is no serious
debate that Congress’s legislative role has diminished as the bureaucracy has
sprawled. Indeed, outside of the tax reform legislation enacted at the close of
the year, Congress’s most significant legislative achievement in 2017 may
well not be a new law at all. Instead, it is arguably Congress’s invocation of
the Congressional Review Act to invalidate a dozen or so major federal
agency rules promulgated at the end of the Obama Administration.8
6. Compare Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 114-1, 129 Stat. 3 (2015), with American Innovation and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No.
114-329, 130 Stat. 2969, 3038 (2017) (reflecting the number of pages taken up with public
laws).
7. U.S. Sen. Mike Lee, Facebook (Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.facebook.com/senator
mikelee/photos/a.182532975111737.42198.178081365556898/684070008291362/?type=3&thea
ter [https://perma.cc/5UHQ-94RN].
8. See Geo. Wash. U. Reg. Stud. Ctr., Congressional Review Act Tracker 2017
(last updated Oct. 25, 2017), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/regulatory
studies.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/CRA%20Tracker%2010-25-2017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5GDT-Q2BS]. See generally Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122
Harv. L. Rev. 2162, 2162–64 (2009) (describing process under the Congressional Review Act
including that the statute only requires a simple majority in both chambers to pass the joint
resolution of disapproval).
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In light of the modern realities of federal lawmaking, it is no surprise
that calls for reform of Congress’s role in the administrative state amplified
during the latter years of the Obama Administration. For instance, some
Republicans in Congress established the Article I Project: a “conservative
reform agenda” to “[r]eclaim[ ] Congress’s power of the purse,”
“[r]eform[ ] legislative ‘cliffs,’ ” “[r]eassert[ ] congressional authority over
regulations and regulators,” and “curb[ ] executive discretion.”9 In November 2015, the Federalist Society started a similar Article I Initiative, with the
mission “to restore Congress to its rightful place in the Constitutional
order.”10
One might expect that the 2016 election, with Republicans gaining control of the presidency and Congress, would cause an undoing of a fair
amount of the Obama Administration’s regulatory actions as well as muted
calls by congressional Republicans and conservatives for Article I reform.
Deregulation is happening, but the Article I Project and Article I Initiative
have continued. And calls for restoring Congress’s place in the modern administrative state may now find more allies from the other side of the aisle.
Against this political backdrop, the Yale University Press could not have
chosen a better time to publish Cornell law professor Josh Chafetz’s11 important new book, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation of Powers. In Congress’s Constitution, Chafetz provides a roadmap for
Congress to (re)assert its powers in federal policymaking and governance.
Chafetz explains that “Congress is certainly not at a necessary disadvantage
across the board as against the other branches” (p. 42). Instead, Congress
possesses many powerful tools to compete with the other branches of government. These tools have deep historical roots. Chafetz exhaustively chronicles their evolution from seventeenth-century English parliamentary
practices, to the codification of Article I of the U.S. Constitution, to the
development of congressional practice in American governance over the
centuries to the present day. To the extent Congress has lost its ability to
utilize the tools effectively, Chafetz argues that such loss of power “is a contingent fact, and one that can be reversed” (p. 42).
Congress’s Constitution is a commanding exposition of Congress’s powers vis-à-vis the other branches of the federal government. It is an important
read for scholars of administrative law, legislation, and the separation of
powers, and it should be required reading for new congressional staffers and
federal agency legislative affairs personnel. As Philip Wallach observes,
9. U.S. Sen. Mike Lee, The Article I Project, U.S. Sen. Mike Lee, https://www.lee.senate
.gov/public/index.cfm/article-one-project [https://perma.cc/ZN9V-FDVY].
10. Article I Initiative Division, Federalist Soc’y, https://www.fed-soc.org/practice
_groups/detail/article-i-initiative [https://perma.cc/UCJ9-H93M]; see also David M. McIntosh,
NLC: The Article I Initiative, Federalist Soc’y (Nov. 14, 2015), https://fedsoc.org/commen
tary/blog-posts/nlc-the-article-i-initiative [https://perma.cc/NS9Q-H8ZM] (noting that the initiative launched at the Federalist Society’s 2015 National Lawyers Convention).
11. Josh Chafetz is a Professor of Law at Cornell Law School (not to be confused with
Jason Chaffetz, former Chair of the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform).
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“Chafetz’s presentation of this material is masterful, pitched so as to be accessible to the novice and yet genuinely informative even to the expert.”12
Congress’s Constitution fulfills Chafetz’s “hope that the reader will be surprised, both by the efficacy with which some of these tools have been (and
are being) used, and also by their potential for use in future interbranch
conflicts” (p. 42).
In this Review, I focus on two observations. In Part I, I summarize and
analyze the “potent toolbox” of “hard powers” and “soft powers” that Congress can wield to play its proper role in our separation-of-powers framework (pp. 3, 6). Whereas Chafetz primarily frames these powers in relation
to the second and third branches of government—the president and the
courts, respectively—this Review explores how the toolbox is and can be
used to constrain what some call the “fourth branch”: the modern administrative state.13 To be sure, Chafetz does not ignore federal agencies; they are,
after all, creatures of statute and subject to varying degrees of presidential
control. But Congress’s Constitution is less focused on addressing Congress’s
role in response to “the rise and rise of the administrative state.”14 The tools
Chafetz has identified are quite powerful in shaping the principal-agent relationship between Congress and federal agencies and thereby influencing the
vast regulatory activity discussed at the outset.
In Part II, I turn to what Congress’s Constitution expressly does not address: Congress’s core function of passing laws.15 Chafetz limits his book to
Congress’s other tools. This limitation is no doubt a reasonable decision, as
the book is already quite ambitious. And, as Chafetz acknowledges,
“[b]roadening the scope beyond legislation is essential if one truly hopes to
understand Congress’s ability to have an impact on our national political
12. Philip A. Wallach, Congress’s Constitution – If They Can Keep It, L. & Liberty (May
1, 2017), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2017/05/01/congresss-constitution-if-they-can-keep-it/
[https://perma.cc/EE4D-9LBS]; accord Matt Glassman, Congress’s Death Is Greatly Exaggerated,
LegBranch.com (Sept. 20, 2017), http://www.legbranch.com/theblog/2017/9/20/if-you-better-understood-congress-youd-like-it-more [https://perma.cc/EJ8V-5VRT] (“The structural
analysis is clear, methodical, and insightful. While some of the territory will be well known to
those familiar with separation of powers, the presentation is top-notch and the connections to
early English democracy make for striking revelations.”).
13. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions,
1987 Duke L.J. 387, 403 (citing President’s Comm. on Admin. Mgmt., Report of the
Committee with Studies of Administrative Management in the Federal Government
39–43 (1937)) (“This failure to address the distinctive constitutional position of the administrative agencies—their status as a ‘fourth branch of government’—robbed structuralism of its
power to legitimate administrative government.”).
14. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
1231 (1994).
15. Adam White makes a similar observation in his review of Congress’s Constitution.
Adam White, The Least Dangerous Branch, Wall Street J. (Aug. 8, 2017, 7:18 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/the-least-dangerous-branch-1502234290 (on file with the Michigan Law
Review) (“But without considering Congress’s fundamental legislative power, the reader can
never fully grasp the implications of its increasing failure to use that power to legislate reforms
to the laws that govern us today.”).
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life” (p. 2). But for someone like me who studies congressional control of
federal agencies, it is hard not to fixate on the point that all of these tools
exist principally to help facilitate Congress’s core legislative activity. If Congress is not regularly engaged in passing laws, it seems that the wisdom—
and perhaps even legitimacy—of these tools are called into question.
In raising this concern, I’m not writing on a blank slate. Political scientists have spent decades examining the costs of legislating clearly and how
members of Congress and congressional committees have incentives to encourage (or at least not discourage) statutory ambiguity and then influence
agency implementation of that ambiguity through oversight tools and other
pressures16—many of which Chafetz documents in Congress’s Constitution.
As Neomi Rao and I have explored in the contexts of the nondelegation
doctrine and Chevron deference, respectively, these incentives could lead to
“administrative collusion” between members of Congress and the federal
agencies they oversee.17
This observation is not a criticism of Congress’s Constitution. Instead, it
serves as a word of caution about Congress’s use of this potent toolbox without also engaging in a regular and sustained agenda of passing laws. To restore Congress’s place in the modern administrative state, it is not enough
for members of Congress and congressional committees to more effectively
oversee and influence regulatory lawmaking. The collective Congress must
also regularly legislate. Congress must reauthorize and modernize the organic statutes that govern federal agencies, respond to regulatory activity
with which the current Congress may disagree, and preserve the proper separation of powers between the legislative and executive (or, better said, regulatory) branches of government.
I. Congress’s Toolbox for Constraining the Regulatory State
In 2015, the Administrative Conference of the United States engaged me
as an academic consultant to examine the role of federal agencies in the
legislative process, with a particular emphasis on “technical drafting assistance.”18 It turns out that federal agencies play a substantial role in the legislative process. Agencies both propose legislation that advances agency or
16. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243, 254 (1987); Mathew D.
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev. 431, 468–81
(1989); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165, 166, 174–75 (1984).
17. Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1463, 1504 (2015) (“By fracturing the collective Congress and empowering individual members, delegation also promotes collusion between members of Congress
and administrative agencies.”); Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1377, 1415–16 (2017) (exploring the problem of “administrative collusion” with respect
to the role of federal agencies in the legislative process).
18. This engagement resulted in a report and a set of recommendations the Conference
adopted. See Christopher J. Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process:
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presidential objectives and provide technical assistance on legislation drafted
by Congress. In fact, interviews at some twenty federal agencies revealed that
agencies provide technical drafting assistance on the vast majority of the
proposed legislation that directly affects them and on most such legislation
that gets enacted.19
The agency officials interviewed also noted that few congressional requests for technical drafting assistance go unanswered by their agency—regardless of any factor including the party affiliation of the request or the
likelihood of the legislation becoming law.20 A predominant reason for such
responsiveness concerns the tools Congress has to affect agency behavior.
Congress’s legislative power to change the agency’s statutory mandate, or at
least the threat of such legislative action, is obviously one factor. But Congress’s oversight powers also matter. As one agency official noted, when providing technical drafting assistance “oversight is always in the back of our
minds.”21 As another put it, when a senior agency official is scheduled to
appear at a congressional hearing, his agency always makes sure to respond
to all technical drafting assistance requests beforehand.22
That congressional oversight affects agency behavior is not a novel observation. Any course on legislation or administrative law covers the basics
of congressional oversight. Congress’s Constitution, however, provides a historically richer and more comprehensive account of Congress’s core powers
on this front. Chafetz groups these powers into six main tools, divided between what he labels “hard powers” and “soft powers.” As further discussed
in Part II, Chafetz frames these tools broadly in relation to the other
branches of government and the branches’ competition for power in the
public sphere. In this Review, I focus on the oversight role of this toolbox in
constraining the regulatory state. The following table depicts this toolbox.
Each tool will be briefly discussed in turn.

Technical Assistance in Statutory Drafting (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2655901
[https://perma.cc/DZ45-FMHC]; Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161,
78,161–63 (Dec. 16, 2015) (summarizing findings and adopting recommendations from ACUS
report).
19. See Walker, supra note 18, at 13–16. But see James J. Brudney, Contextualizing
Shadow Conversations, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 37, 39–45 (2017), https://
www.pennlawreview.com/online/166-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-37.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C2HP5CH] (disputing the extent of agency involvement in technical drafting assistance based on
author’s personal involvement in the legislative process).
20. Walker, supra note 18, at 16–20.
21. Id. at 17.
22. Id.
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Table 1
C o n g re s s ’s T o o lb o x fo r C o n s tra in in g th e R e g u la to ry S ta te
Tool
T h e P o w e r o f th e P u rse
H a rd P o w e rs

(C h a p te r T h re e )
T h e P e rso n n e l P o w e r
(C h a p te r F o u r)

C o n te m p t o f C o n g re ss
(C h a p te r F ive )
T h e F re e d o m o f S p e e ch o r

S o ft P o w e rs

D e b a te (C h a p te r S ix)

In te rn a l D iscip lin e
(C h a p te r S e ve n )
C a m e ra l R u le s
(C h a p te r E ig h t)

D e s c rip tio n
A p p ro p ria tio n s la w s, sp e n d in g a u th o rity, a n d a n n u a l b u d g e t
p ro ce ss fo r fe d e ra l a g e n cie s
V a rio u s a p p o in tm e n t p o w e rs o ve r a g e n cy o fficia ls, lim its o n
a ctin g a n d re ce ss a p p o in tm e n ts, a b ility to a ffe ct re m o va l,
a n d im p e a ch m e n t p o w e rs
C o n stitu tio n a l a n d sta tu to ry a u th o rity to h o ld a g e n cy o fficia ls
in co n te m p t o f C o n g re ss
C o n g re ssio n a l im m u n ity w h e n criticizin g a g e n cy o fficia ls a n d
re g u la to ry a ctio n s, in clu d in g sh a rin g n o n p u b lic in fo rm a tio n
a b o u t a g e n cy a ctivitie s
A b ility to in te rn a lly d iscip lin e m e m b e rs o f C o n g re ss fo r, in te r
a lia , im p ro p e rly in flu e n cin g fe d e ra l a g e n cie s
A b ility to stru ctu re co n g re ssio n a l ru le s to a llo w fo r, in te r a lia ,
co m m itte e h e a rin g s, in ve stig a tio n s, d o cu m e n t a n d te stim o n y
su b p o e n a s, a n d o th e r o ve rsig h t to o ls

1. The Power of the Purse (Chapter Three). The first hard power is the
power of the purse. As Chafetz notes, at first blush “[i]t may appear odd to
begin the discussion of specific congressional powers with the power of the
purse, given that this book focuses on mechanisms that are available to individual houses or members of Congress” (p. 45). But its appropriations authority might be its most powerful tool to oversee the administrative state.
The appropriations tool is particularly powerful because each chamber of
Congress has a veto on federal agency funding in the annual budget process.
Congress’s separate powers to legislate and appropriate are critical in our
separation-of-powers framework. At the founding “the separation of purse
and sword was the Federalists’ strongest rejoinder to Anti-Federalist fears of
a tyrannical president” (p. 57).
Chafetz justly emphasizes the importance of the annual nature of the
appropriations process (pp. 61–66)—requiring federal agencies to be regularly concerned about the efficiency, effectiveness, and propriety of their regulatory activities. If an agency falls short of congressional expectations (or
even just fails to be responsive to congressional requests for more information), Congress can punish the agency with “a not-so-gentle tug on the
purse strings” (p. 72). Congress has also been known, perhaps more so now
than in prior eras, to insert substantive riders into appropriations legislation
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to forbid certain agency uses of appropriated funds.23 Substantive riders and
funding reductions are powerful ways of influencing agency behavior. Congress’s Constitution introduces rich examples of the power of the purse at
play over the centuries, including an important treatment of Congress’s ultimate appropriations power: government shutdown (pp. 68–71).
Unfortunately, Congress’s power of the purse has weakened in at least
three important respects, all of which have resulted in a shift of power toward the regulatory state.24 First, there has been a dramatic rise in
“mandatory” spending, as opposed to “discretionary” spending; such
mandatory spending is not subject to the annual appropriations process.
Chafetz reports that mandatory spending made up 69% of the federal
budget in fiscal year 2016. This means that “for 69 percent of the federal
budget, Congress has ceded the institutional advantage of annual appropriations and surrendered the institutional gains of 1689” (p. 62; footnote omitted). Second, in the 1800s and early 1900s, the House took the lead on the
budgeting front, but “the growth of the regulatory state put pressure on the
fragmented manner in which Congress went about budgeting, and the era of
‘legislative dominance’ of the budget process came to an end shortly after
World War I” (pp. 62–63; footnotes omitted). Third, though not covered in
Congress’s Constitution, Congress’s decision to grant some agencies with feesetting authority, which results in funding that goes directly to the agency,
has similarly weakened the power of the purse.25
Although Congress’s power of the purse remains forceful, the rise of the
modern administrative state has weakened it.
2. The Personnel Power (Chapter Four). The second hard power is Congress’s personnel power. This power actually consists of a suite of tools that
includes Congress’s role in appointing agency officials, limitations on the
president’s ability to use acting officers or recess appointments, and Congress’s ability to remove officials in the other branches of government.
Congress’s appointment power is twofold. First, the Constitution requires “Advice and Consent of the Senate” for confirmation of any principal
23. See pp. 66–73; see also Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress 111–28 (2012) (explaining the evolution of the
appropriations and budget processes into a prominent and “unorthodox” form of legislating).
Indeed, federal agencies also play an important substantive and technical drafting role in appropriations legislation—a role that merits much further exploration and agency coordination. See Walker, supra note 18, at 10–11, 38–39; see also Adoption of Recommendations, 80
Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015) (“Appropriations legislation presents agencies with
potential coordination problems as substantive provisions or ‘riders’ may require technical
drafting assistance, but agency processes for reviewing appropriations legislation are channeled
through agency budget or finance offices. It is crucial for the budget office to communicate
with an agency’s legislative counsel office to anticipate and later address requests for technical
assistance related to appropriations bills.”).
24. There is also an important debate about the extent to which Congress can use the
power of the purse to intrude on the president’s Article II powers. See, e.g., Zachary S. Price,
Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018).
25. See generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Federal User Fees: A Design
Guide (2008), http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/203357.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8RY-3HRP].
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officers at federal agencies.26 Second, as for any inferior officers, Congress
has the power to decide in whom to confer the power to appoint those
officers: “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.”27 This latter institutional design authority allows Congress to
allocate personnel power closer or further away from the president or the
federal agencies to increase political accountability or independence, respectively. Congress may have even greater institutional control over nonofficer
agency employees, though current litigation over the constitutionality of administrative law judges could result in redefining this officer-employee distinction.28 It is worth noting that the federal government now agrees with
the petitioner in that litigation that administrative law judges at the Securities and Exchange Commission are “officers” and not mere “employees” for
purposes of the Appointments Clause.29
The reach of the Senate’s advice-and-consent power extends beyond approving the president’s choice to run a federal agency. For instance, the Senate holds a committee hearing on each nominee and can extract pledges
from the nominee about how she will run the agency, including commitments concerning congressional oversight cooperation. Nominees often have
one-on-one meetings with senators, during which additional discussions
about the agency’s regulatory activities can take place. Consent can be withheld to force the president to choose a nominee with a different regulatory
agenda, or it can be delayed until the agency complies with certain oversight
requests or completes (or commits to complete) certain regulatory activities.
The Senate committee’s advice-and-consent power is often also exercised in
the form of refusing to hold the nomination hearing at all.
It is further worth noting that, under Senate rules, this advice-and-consent power for principal officers was even stronger before 2013—the year
Senate Democrats eliminated the filibuster for nominations for administrative appointees (and lower-court judicial nominees).30 The elimination of
the filibuster strengthens the majority party in the Senate by reducing the
26. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 Stan. L.
Rev. 443, 454 (2018) (arguing that as an original matter the term “officers” would likely apply
to thousands of agency officials currently considered mere “employees”); see also Bandimere v.
SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept. 29, 2017) (No. 17-475);
Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), petition for en banc review
denied, 868 F.3d 1021 (Mem.) (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, (U.S. Jan. 12, 2018) (No. 17130).
29. See Jennifer Mascott, New Government Position on the SEC’s ALJs: They Are Article II
“Officers,” Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment (Nov. 29, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/newgovernment-position-on-the-secs-aljs-they-are-article-ii-officers/ [https://perma.cc/GG4PKHL5].
30. See, e.g., Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on Nominees, Wash.Post (Nov. 21, 2013), http://wapo.st/1c6f4AH?tid=SS_tw&utm_
term=.Eb1d7a2f35d1 [https://perma.cc/4U7K-MJ2E]; see also Russell L. Weaver, “Advice and
Consent” in Historical Perspective, 64 Duke L.J. 1717, 1749–52 (2015) (detailing evolution of
confirmation process for nonjudicial nominees).
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number of senators needed for consent from effectively sixty to a simple
majority. The Senate’s collective power, however, is weakened by reducing
the potential to negotiate for more moderate nominees—“mainstream”
nominees, as the Senate Democrats have framed the issue in the Trump Administration31—or for other concessions from the president. The elimination doesn’t just weaken the collective Senate by excluding the minority
party. It also weakens the moderates in the majority party. With the filibuster in place, moderates of the president’s party in the Senate majority had
more political capital to vote at the cloture stage to block more controversial
nominees based on respect for the Senate’s august procedural rules. Now,
these senators cannot block controversial nominees without paying the costlier political price of voting down the president’s nominee on merits.32
In addition to Congress’s appointment powers, there are limits on the
president’s ability to bypass Congress’s advice-and-consent power by
designating acting officers or making recess appointments. As for the acting
appointment power, Chafetz notes that presidents have used such appointments since at least 1801, but Congress has limited the scope of the tool by
statute since at least 1795 (pp. 134–36). Last Term, the Supreme Court had
the occasion to interpret the current version of the Vacancies Act, construing
it to limit the president’s power to designate nominees for an office who are
serving as acting officers.33 Controversy concerning acting officers is back in
the news with the dueling-directors dispute at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Last year the outgoing CFPB director elevated an
internal agency official to deputy director, such that by statute she would
become the acting director upon the prior director’s resignation.34 The president responded by naming his own acting director of this so-called independent agency—the current director of the Office of Management and
Budget within the Executive Office of the President.35 Federal courts are now
31. See, e.g., Karoun Demirjian, President Trump’s Cabinet Picks Are Likely to Be Easily
Confirmed. That’s Because of Senate Democrats., Wash. Post (Nov. 18, 2016), http://wapo.st/
2g4F0rS?tid=SS_tw&utm_term=.8f0318c16bbd [https://perma.cc/ZU96-D72C] (“The problem is, those [advice-and-consent] tools are now severely limited. It would fall to Republicans
to join Democrats to stand in the way of any Trump appointment deemed objectionable.”).
32. Chafetz addresses the elimination of the filibuster later in his book, when he discusses “[t]he [p]itfalls of [c]ameral [o]rganization.” Pp. 296–301. As Chafetz observes, “if
unified government does not result in filibuster reform, one would expect the use of minority
obstruction to continue to serve as a justification for executive aggrandizement. In structuring
its rules so as to allow for indefinite minority obstruction, the Senate costs itself power.”
P. 301.
33. See NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 935 (2017) (holding that statutory prohibition applies to “first assistants who have automatically assumed acting duties” as well as “to
PAS officers and senior employees serving as acting officers at the president’s behest”).
34. See Charlie Savage, Who’s the Real Head of the Consumer Watchdog Agency? A Legal
Fight, Explained, N.Y. Times (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/27/business/
cfpb-mulvaney-leandra-english-legal-explained.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
35. See Daniel Hemel, For Better or Worse, Mick Mulvaney Probably Is the Acting Director
of the CFPB, Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment (Nov. 26, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/
for-better-or-worse-mick-mulvaney-probably-is-the-acting-director-of-the-cfpb/ [https://
perma.cc/KT9Q-GYB8]; see also English v. Trump, No. CV 17-2534, 2018 WL 358777, at *1
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left to sort out who is the real acting director and whether the Constitution
places limits on either possible acting director.36
Recess appointments, like acting officer designations, “have a long pedigree in American constitutional practice—just to take a few examples, Jefferson recess appointed the Washington justices of the peace while awaiting
their Senate confirmation; Jackson recess appointed Roger Brooke Taney as
secretary of the treasury; and Eisenhower recess appointed Lewis Strauss as
secretary of commerce” (p. 137). The Constitution confines recess appointment power “to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of
the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their
next Session.”37 In 2014, the Supreme Court answered three key questions
about the scope of the president’s recess appointment power. In NLRB v.
Noel Canning, the Court held that (1) the recess appointment clause applied
to both intersession and intrasession recesses; (2) the phrase “vacancies that
may happen” does not limit appointments to vacancies that first arise during the recess; and (3) pro forma sessions of Congress count for purposes of
eliminating a recess, such that three days between pro forma sessions, for
instance, “is too short a time to bring a recess within the scope of the
Clause.”38 Noel Canning’s practical effect is that “[a] president whose party
controls neither house of Congress can be prevented from making recess
appointments altogether; a president whose party controls at least one house
will be able to make recess appointments at least some of the time” (p. 142).
The remaining tools within Congress’s personnel power concern its
ability to remove government officials. To what extent Congress can statutorily condition the president’s removal authority of agency officers is a complicated question that exceeds the scope of this Review.39 But, as Chafetz
underscores, there are at least two other ways for Congress to affect removal
(pp. 142–51). Although the Court has held that Congress cannot have a
“direct” role (short of impeachment) in the removal of officers over which
the president has constitutional removal authority, Congress may be able to
indirectly remove officers by eliminating the office and creating a new office
(p. 143). Of course, this would require legislation and thus supermajority
support to overcome the likely presidential veto (p. 145).
The second path to removal—Congress’s impeachment power40—does
not require legislation but historically has been limited to “malfeasance, not
(D.D.C. Jan. 10, 2018) (denying the CFPB deputy director’s motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the OMB director from displacing her as acting director of the CFPB).
36. See Hemel, supra note 35.
37. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
38. 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556–57 (2014).
39. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484
(2010) (holding that “multilevel protection from removal is contrary to Article II’s vesting of
the executive power in the President”). See generally Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 Ala. L. Rev. 1205, 1209 (2014) (advocating for “a formal
framework of removal as necessary and sufficient for presidential control”).
40. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,

1112

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 116:1101

just political disagreement or even incompetence” (p. 149). Additionally,
“although in theory impeachment applies to ‘all civil Officers of the United
States’ in addition to the president and vice president, in practice it is likely
to remain limited to presidents, vice presidents, and federal judges—in other
words, officers whom there is no other way to remove” (p. 148; footnote
omitted). Although Congress’s various removal powers may not have much
effect on constraining the regulatory state, its appointments powers certainly
do when used effectively.
3. Contempt of Congress (Chapter Five). Congress’s final hard power is its
contempt authority. Chafetz dedicates nearly thirty pages (almost a tithe) of
Congress’s Constitution to detailing the historical foundations—both in England and in early American governance—of these contempt powers
(pp. 153–79). This historical account is important because the Constitution
itself does not expressly grant Congress any contempt power, yet “it has been
widely accepted from the earliest years of the Republic that the houses do, in
fact, have such a power” (p. 179). Chafetz also carefully chronicles the use of
Congress’s contempt authority with respect to federal agency officials, including the executive branch’s resistance through the invocation of executive
privilege as well as the decision to enforce contempt and subpoena powers
through congressional enforcement mechanisms or through the courts
(pp. 181–98).
Congress’s contempt power is critical for overseeing the federal bureaucracy—whether members of Congress “are pondering impeachment, judging the elections, returns, and qualifications of members, conducting
oversight, appropriating, considering legislation, or carrying out any of their
other functions” (p. 180). Yet Congress’s contempt power has not been as
effective in the post-Watergate era (p. 189). Through numerous historical
examples, Chafetz details how the threat of contempt can be a heavy stick to
encourage federal agencies to turn over information, testify before committees, or otherwise cooperate with their legislative principals (p. 198).
4. The Freedom of Speech or Debate (Chapter Six). The first of Congress’s
soft powers is the freedom of speech and debate.41 The freedom of speech
and debate may appear most helpful in inserting members of Congress into
a public debate with the president, which is no doubt an important separation-of-powers tool. But Chafetz brilliantly focuses more on a subtler advantage: how this speech immunity helps Congress publicly release information
about what the regulatory state is doing “without the threat of prosecution
by and in front of the other branches” (p. 231). This power is at its zenith
“with regard to [congressional] views on matters that the other branches do
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”); cf. id. art. I, §§ 2–3 (providing
that the House “shall have the sole Power of Impeachment,” whereas “[t]he Senate shall have
the sole Power to try all Impeachments”).
41. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“The Senators and Representatives shall . . . in all
Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their
Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other
Place.”).
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not wish to have aired, matters they have chosen to label as ‘secret’ ”
(p. 231). We see this soft power at play in debates this year regarding public
disclosure of dueling memoranda from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on government surveillance of Trump campaign officials.42 Indeed, the mere threat of making sensitive agency information
public, which is bolstered by this power, allows Congress to better control
regulatory processes and outcomes.
5. Internal Discipline (Chapter Seven). Congress’s second soft power
concerns its authority to internally discipline its members. As Article I details, “[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds,
expel a Member.”43
It is intriguing that Chafetz identifies Congress’s internal discipline authority as a congressional power vis-à-vis the other branches, as opposed to
just an internal self-governance tool. He details how Parliament and Congress have used internal discipline, including Congress’s more recent emphasis on “ethics” matters. One might consider such self-policing more of a
duty than a power, but Chafetz argues that “it can also be a source of soft
power: when exercised responsibly, it can build or restore public trust in the
institution, thus enhancing its ability to engage successfully in the public
sphere” (p. 232; footnote omitted). Chafetz laments that Congress has failed
to use this soft power effectively, though he finds some hope in the House’s
creation of an Office of Congressional Ethics “that the chambers will begin
to take more advantage of this means of building public trust” (p. 266).
I’ll return to this power in Part II when considering how Congress could
better utilize its internal discipline powers to discourage administrative collusion between individual members of Congress (or congressional committees) and the federal agencies they oversee.
6. Cameral Rules (Chapter Eight). The final soft power is Congress’s ability to determine its own rules for its proceedings. As Chafetz notes,
“[w]ithout that authority, the chambers would not be able to structure their
budget deliberations, issue subpoenas for testimony or documents, issue
contempt citations when those subpoenas were defied, create an Office of
Congressional Ethics, or, indeed, do much of anything” (p. 267). This power
is what sets the rules of the game for Congress’s oversight of the regulatory
state, including the delegation of such oversight to various congressional
committees.
As Chafetz chronicles, Congress’s cameral-rules power allows each
chamber to structure its interactions with the president and the administrative state without requiring the consent of the other chamber, much less the
president, as would be the case for regular legislation. Cameral rulemaking
42. See, e.g., Marty Lederman, It Is Up to the House Intel Committee, Not Trump, Whether
to Release the Democratic Memo on the Page FISA Application, Just Security (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/52081/hpsci-trump-release-minority-memo/ [https://perma.cc/
6MMW-AERH].
43. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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can be powerful. Perhaps the best example of the cameral-rules power, as
Chafetz recounts, relates to the rise of the Republican War Hawks in the
early 1810s, which resulted in Henry Clay becoming speaker of the House.
Clay then organized powerful standing committees in the House to conduct
hearings and investigations as well as issue reports on their findings
(pp. 283–84). The Senate followed suit shortly thereafter by creating additional standing committees in the Senate and shifting the Senate’s legislative
activities to those committees (pp. 284–85). In addition to creating more
congressional oversight by committee, this standing-committee innovation
shifted legislative power away from the president and back to Congress by
encouraging standing committees to be the primary initiators of significant
legislation.44
Unfortunately, with the exponential growth of the administrative state
in the twentieth century, Congress did not use its cameral rules to keep pace:
“Just as the chambers in their earliest years lacked institutional infrastructure and were therefore forced to rely on the executive branch, so too the
expansion of the administrative state led to the chambers’ having insufficient
resources to form an effective counterweight” (p. 291). In 1946, the same
year Congress struck the “fierce compromise” in enacting the Administrative
Procedure Act to govern the regulatory state,45 Congress also passed the Legislative Reorganization Act, which strengthened congressional committees,
increased congressional staffing, and created the nonpartisan Offices of Legislative Counsel and the now-named Congressional Research Service
(pp. 292–93). This reform had its flaws. For instance, as Chafetz explains,
reforms in the 1970s attempted to cut back on the excessive power of committee chairs (pp. 293–96).
This final tool regarding Congress’s power to determine the rules of its
own proceedings should not be understated. It plays a critical role in organizing Congress’s oversight activities of the regulatory state. Indeed,
among its more powerful uses today, both chambers of Congress have used
their cameral-rule authority to empower committee staff with certain investigative powers to take depositions and subpoena documents and information.46 As Brian Feinstein, among others, has documented, in the modern
era predominated by lawmaking by regulation, “congressional oversight of
44. See generally Walter Kravitz, Evolution of the Senate’s Committee System, 441 Annals
Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 27, 29–30 (1974) (“Until James Madison’s administrations, the
legislature habitually relied upon the chief executive and his associates for the initiative on
much significant legislation. Congress lost its traditional agenda-maker . . . because of the deep
and bitter estrangement between Madison and his Congresses and turned to standing committees to fill the vacuum.”).
45. E.g., George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1560 (1996).
46. Michael Bopp expanded on this observation at the 2017 American Bar Association
Administrative Law Conference. See generally The Power to Investigate: Table of Authorities of
House and Senate Committees for the 115th Congress, Gibson Dunn (June 1, 2017), http://
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/Power-to-Investigate-Table-of-Authorities-ofHouse-and-Senate-Committees—115th-Congress/ [https://perma.cc/ME3M-S29Y] (detailing
the investigative powers set by cameral rules of each congressional committee).
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agency action is one of the most powerful tools that Congress has to exercise
some measure of control over administrative policymaking.”47
II. The Perils of Congressional Oversight Without Legislation
As detailed in Part I, Congress’s Constitution assembles a potent toolbox,
and lays a resounding historical foundation, for Congress to assert a coequal
role in our separation-of-powers framework.
For Chafetz, this framework is not formalist, much less constitutionally
fixed in time. Instead, it is a fluid, multiplicity-based approach: “a dynamic,
inter-institutional competition for public support, played out on a field that
is given form and structure by the written Constitution” (p. 26). Chafetz
also resists a separation-of-powers framing that is merely one of separation
of parties.48 The influence of political parties, for Chafetz, is but “one factor
that goes to the judiciousness of the exercise of congressional power” (p. 35).
Put differently, “institutional authority is something built by successful
public engagement through time. It neither arises nor disappears instantaneously” (p. 314). Matt Glassman provides an apt assessment of Chafetz’s conception of separation of powers:
Congress’s Constitution beautifully portrays a legislature not only wellequipped to compete with the modern presidency but, indeed, already
competing more forcefully than casual observation would reveal. It forces
the reader to consider that perceived failings of legislative government in a
modern separation of powers system are part illusory and part consequence of poor strategic choices, rather than simply systemic failure of an
outmoded system. . . . [T]he tools of power are available for Congress to
compete in the public sphere, and as the 115th Congress unfolds, the equilibrium has been disturbed enough that the dust has been shaken off many
of them.49

Some of us, however, are also concerned about a different, perhaps
more formalist separation of powers: the separation of lawmaking and lawexecution powers. These principles are embedded in the Constitution and
draw on rule of law values set forth long ago by Blackstone, Locke, and
47. Brian D. Feinstein, Designing Executive Agencies for Congressional Influence, 69 Admin. L. Rev. 259, 265 (2017); see also id. at 265–66 (“An empirical examination of the consequences of congressional oversight reveals that bureaucratic issues discussed in committee
hearings are 19.7% less likely to reoccur than are similar bureaucratic issues that are not subject to hearings.”) (citing Brian D. Feinstein, Congress in the Administrative State, 95 Wash. U.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018)).
48. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 2312, 2314 (2006) (arguing that “the invisibility of political parties has left
constitutional discourse about separation of powers with no conceptual resources to understand basic features of the American political system”).
49. Glassman, supra note 12. This Review does not attempt to do justice, much less
respond, to Chafetz’s conception of the multiplicity-based separation of powers, which he sets
forth in the first two chapters of the book (pp. 15–42) and in his prior writing. See Josh
Chafetz, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 120 Yale L.J. 1084 (2011); see
also Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 768–78 (2012).
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Montesquieu. Blackstone, for instance, proclaimed that “where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct hands, the former will take care
not to entrust the latter with so large a power, as may tend to the subversion
of its own independence, and therewith of the liberty of the subject.”50 By
contrast, Montesquieu warned: “When legislative power is united with executive power in a single person or in a single body of the magistracy, there is
no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes
tyrannical laws will execute them tyrannically.”51 We find a similar warning
in Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, in that it is “too great a temptation
to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have the
power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute
them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they
make . . . .”52
As detailed in the Introduction, federal agencies dominate lawmaking
today, as Congress cedes more and more policymaking power to its bureaucratic agents. This consolidation of lawmaking and law-execution activity in
the federal bureaucracy is troubling. While I do not fully embrace Philip
Hamburger’s provocative critique of the modern administrative state, many
of his historical criticisms of extralegal lawmaking or “absolute power” have
considerable force and merit careful consideration.53 Yet, as discussed in Part
I, the powerful toolbox assembled in Congress’s Constitution addresses these
distinct separation-of-powers concerns as well. Through an impressive number of historical examples, Chafetz teaches us how members of Congress can
better use these tools to rein in the administrative state and prevent federal
agencies from abusing their consolidated lawmaking and law-execution
powers.
Separation-of-powers concerns remain, however, when members of
Congress (as opposed to the collective Congress) serve as the oversight principals in the principal-agent bureaucratic model. Political scientists and
economists have spent decades theorizing how members of Congress (and
congressional committees) have incentives to delegate by statutory ambiguity distinct from an institutional desire to divide labor and leverage agency
expertise or to otherwise minimize the costs of legislating.54 As Neomi Rao
50. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *142.
51. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1768).
52. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 76 (C. B. Macpherson ed., 1980)
(1690).
53. See Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (2014). But see Paul
Craig, The Legitimacy of US Administrative Law and the Foundations of English Administrative
Law: Setting the Historical Record Straight, Oxford L. Studs. Res. Paper No. 44/2016 (June 30,
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802784 [https://perma.cc/8XBH-NEYW] (criticizing
Hamburger’s account of English history); Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1547 (2015)
(criticizing Hamburger’s account of American administrative law).
54. See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction
Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers (1999) (offering extensive literature review); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721, 1744 (2002) (“The ubiquity of delegation is due to the need for
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has observed, “[t]his literature emphasizes the many benefits members of
Congress can realize through delegation and demonstrates the strong incentives individual legislators have to continue delegating, even though this
might weaken the collective lawmaking power of Congress.”55 These benefits
include shifting blame to the agency for the negative consequences of policymaking while claiming credit for the positive outcomes; providing benefits
for particular constituents to please donors and encourage campaign contributions; and avoiding specification where legislative compromise proves too
costly.56 This relationship between federal agencies and members of Congress can lead to what Rao has coined “administrative collusion”: “By fracturing the collective Congress and empowering individual members,
delegation also promotes collusion between members of Congress and administrative agencies.”57
So how do members of Congress obtain these benefits? They learn to
master the oversight tools chronicled in Congress’s Constitution. Indeed,
compare Chafetz’s toolbox summarized in Part I with Rao’s illustrative list
of ex post oversight powers members of Congress possess to engage in administrative collusion: “committee oversight, threats to reduce appropriations, investigations of administrative conduct, reporting requirements, and
the confirmation process for high-level officials.”58 It is based on this same
oversight toolbox that Rao argues the “influence and control of administration by members of Congress allows lawmakers to also serve as law interpreters, in contravention of basic separation-of-powers principles.”59 As I
explain elsewhere, the substantial role of federal agencies in the legislative
process further complicates the bureaucratic principal-agent model and may
well heighten the risk of administrative collusion.60
The primary tool at the collective Congress’s disposal to combat the risk
of administrative collusion is one Congress’s Constitution expressly does not
address: Congress’s substantive legislative power (p. 2). A return to passing
laws on a regular basis would involve congressional reengagement in the
reauthorization process for the statutes that govern federal agencies. This
legislative engagement would include regular assessment of agency action
(a) authority and (b) division of labor, in any complex institution, whether public or private.
All institutions must take direction from a person, or a small group of people, but the leader
of an institution cannot possibly perform all of its tasks directly.”).
55. Rao, supra note 17, at 1477 (footnote omitted).
56. See Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 54, at 30–32.
57. Rao, supra note 17, at 1504.
58. Id. at 1482.
59. Id. at 1498.
60. Walker, supra note 17, at 1416 (“That the agency confers with the member of Congress in the shadows at the outset of the legislative process further facilitates this risk of administrative collusion. Not only does the federal agency have incentives to suggest legislative
language that is broad, flexible, or otherwise ambiguous in order to preserve or expand the
agency’s regulatory and interpretive authority, the individual member of Congress faces similar incentives. And both share incentives to collude to delegate policymaking authority to the
agency through ambiguity.”).
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and regular recalibration if the agency’s regulatory activities are inconsistent
with the collective Congress’s policy objectives. Congress would update stale
statutory mandates so that federal agencies could address new problems and
changed circumstances. It would also include Congress refining and expanding the tools it has created by statute to monitor and constrain the
regulatory state, including the Administrative Procedure Act61 and the Article I agencies and related entities—the Congressional Budget Office,62 Congressional Research Service,63 Government Accountability Office,64 and Joint
Committee on Taxation65—that help Congress gather information, leverage
expertise, conduct investigations, and audit regulatory activities.
In a world where Congress regularly legislates, Chevron deference would
be far less problematic because Congress would intervene if an agency used
statutory ambiguity to pursue a policy inconsistent with current congressional wishes.66 Indeed, my prior empirical work on agency rule drafters
suggests that the mere threat of more searching review (or, here, the threat
61. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Essay, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure
Act, 69 Admin. L. Rev. 629 (2017) (tracing the statutory and judicial evolution of the Administrative Procedure Act since its enactment in 1946 and discussing current legislative proposals
to reform the statute).
62. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), an Article I federal agency, was created by
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93–344, 88 Stat.
297, to provide Congress with budget and economic information. Its CBO scoring of proposed
legislation plays a critical role in the legislative process, including most recently in Republican
legislative efforts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act. See, e.g., Adam Cancryn, CBO:
Senate ‘Repeal-Replace’ Plan Would Leave 22 Million More Uninsured, Politico (July 20, 2017,
12:30 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/20/republican-health-care-bill-cbo-score240761 [https://perma.cc/JJ8B-G6DP].
63. Some version of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), an Article I federal
agency, has existed since the early 1900s, with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub.
L. 91-150, title II, § 321(a), 84 Stat. 1140, 1181, renaming it from the Legislative Reference
Service to CRS, increasing its resources, and focusing its efforts on research and analysis to
assist Congress in its primary mission of legislating. See generally Ida A. Brudnick, Cong.
Research Serv., RL33471, The Congressional Research Service and the American
Legislative Process (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33471.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F2NB-UART].
64. Established as the Government Accounting Office by the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921, Congress charged this Article I federal agency to “investigate, at the seat of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public
funds, and shall make to the [p]resident . . . and to Congress . . . report[s] . . . [and] recommendations looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expenditures.” Pub. L. 67-13,
§ 312(a), 42 Stat. 20, 25. In 2005, Congress changed the name to the Government Accountability Office to better reflect its current mission. See GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004,
Pub. L. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811.
65. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) is a unique congressional committee established under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 8001. The JCT is a bipartisan and bichamber committee that dates back to the 1920s and plays a critical role in investigating the
executive branch’s collection of internal revenue taxes and in reviewing any legislative or IRS
proposal for a refund or credit of taxes in excess of two million dollars. See generally
Amandeep S. Grewal, The Congressional Revenue Service, 2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 689 (2014).
66. For more on recent criticisms of the deference doctrine set forth in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984), see Christopher J.
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of congressional attention) would encourage federal agencies to interpret
statutes less “aggressively.”67 Without regular legislative activity, by contrast,
agencies may come to view congressional oversight as just the cost of doing
business and not a real constraint on regulatory activity.68
Two related soft powers in Chafetz’s toolbox may help address the threat
of administrative collusion: Congress’s authority to “determine the Rules of
its Proceedings” and its authority to “punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”69 Using
these soft tools, each chamber could establish cameral rules that prohibit
members from unduly influencing federal agencies. The rules could model
the recent innovations in “ethics” rules that Chafetz explores in great detail
(pp. 253–64). Those ethics rules were primarily “attempts to prevent members from being influenced by factors that are believed to corrupt their judgment” (p. 253), whereas these ethics rules would attempt to minimize the
risk of administrative collusion. For example, the rules could include certain
disclosure requirements for congressional communications with federal
agencies or disclosure requirements of contacts with interested parties that
motivated the agency outreach. Each chamber of Congress could then use its
internal discipline authority to publicly censure or otherwise punish members who are found to have violated these rules. Such use of these soft powers merits further exploration and experimentation.
Although using Congress’s internal rules and exercising disciplinary
powers could help mitigate the risk of administrative collusion, such measures are not a substitute for returning to a regular practice of legislating.
The suggested cameral rules certainly would not reverse the shift in lawmaking from Congress to federal agencies.70 As Adam White put it in his review
Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 15 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2–3, 9–21).
67. See Walker, supra note 1, at 1048–65. The 128 agency rule drafters surveyed reported
that they think about Chevron often when interpreting statutes and drafting rules. Id. They
also think about subsequent judicial review, and believe the rule is more likely to survive
judicial review under Chevron than under the less deferential Skidmore standard or de novo
review. Id. at 1059–65. To a somewhat lesser extent, they also indicated that their agency is
more aggressive in its interpretive efforts if it believes the reviewing court will apply Chevron
deference (as opposed to Skidmore deference or de novo review). Id. at 1063. These findings
are further explored in Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 703, 715–28 (2014).
68. This is a paraphrase of Philip Wallach’s excellent observation at the 2017 American
Bar Association Administrative Law Conference. Philip Wallach, Senior Fellow, Brookings
Inst., Address at the American Bar Association Administrative Law Conference: Reinvigorating
Congress’s Oversight Role of the Federal Bureaucracy (Oct. 19, 2017).
69. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
70. Nor, of course, would a return to regularly passing laws eradicate the risk of administrative collusion. Members of Congress and congressional committees would still face incentives to leave ambiguities in draft legislation. But at least the collective Congress would be
more fully engaged in reauthorizing and updating the organic statutes that govern federal
agencies, thus making federal agencies more responsive to the collective Congress and not just
their committee overseers.

1120

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 116:1101

of Congress’s Constitution, “where Congress declines to pass laws setting national policy on national issues, the policy vacuum is filled inevitably by
presidents, agencies or courts.”71 As discussed in the Introduction, the shift
from lawmaking by statute to lawmaking by regulation surely is a result of
Congress legislating less and delegating more.
Chafetz has advanced a compelling historical case for Congress’s toolbox
consisting of certain hard and soft powers to interact with the other
branches. That said, I cannot escape the conclusion that these powers are
primarily in the Constitution to facilitate the first, core power Article I
grants to Congress: the exclusive power to legislate.72 After all, the annual
appropriations process helps Congress ensure federal agencies faithfully implement their statutory mandates. The power of the purse is not a substitute
for substantive legislation, which it has arguably become with the rise of
substantive riders and the fall of regular legislating. Similarly, Congress’s
personnel and contempt powers, coupled with the various oversight tools
made available by Congress’s soft powers of freedom of speech, cameral
rules, and internal discipline, should not exist as ends in themselves. Instead,
they are powerful means for Congress to collect information and leverage
expertise to pass effective legislation.
To be sure, as Congress’s Constitution illustrates, Congress often uses
hearings, information requests, investigations, audits, and so forth to compete with the other branches of government in the public sphere. But if
Congress does not also use these oversight tools to regularly pass laws, I fear
the legitimacy of the toolbox is called into question. Without the threat of
legislative action, moreover, the efficacy of this toolbox in influencing agency
action is severely diminished. These fears are heightened when members of
Congress, or congressional committees, use these oversight tools to extract
policy outcomes from federal agencies that are contrary to the wishes of the
collective Congress.
Conclusion
Congress’s Constitution provides a timely and cogent historical account
of the collection of powers Congress possesses to compete with the other
branches of government as well as to oversee and influence the thousands of
regulatory actions undertaken by federal agencies each year. Congress must
learn to effectively use this toolbox to restore a proper separation of powers
between the government entities that make and execute federal law.
To restore Congress’s proper role in the modern administrative state,
however, Congress must also return to its core constitutional function of
regularly passing laws. It is not enough for members of Congress and its
committees to influence regulatory lawmaking through oversight. Indeed, in
some ways, Congress’s use of its oversight tools without legislating heightens
71. White, supra note 15.
72. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).
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the risk of administrative collusion. The close of Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer seems to apply with similar
force in this context:
I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in the
hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems. A
crisis that challenges the President equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges
Congress. If not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that “The tools belong to the man who can use them.”
We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of
Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping
through its fingers.73

Having just taken academic leave to spend some time working in Congress, I cannot express much confidence that an Article I renaissance will
take place anytime soon. But that doesn’t mean we should give up. Scholars
of Congress and the administrative state can certainly play an important
role—through both theoretical and empirical work—to help frame the debate and make it accessible to the general public. But ultimately it is up to
Congress to, as Justice Jackson put it, “prevent [lawmaking] power from
slipping through its fingers.”74 Fortunately, as Chafetz demonstrates in Congress’s Constitution, the Constitution provides Congress with all the power it
needs to restore its proper role in the modern administrative state.

73. 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
74. Id.

